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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND SECTION 2-201 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
MICHAEL B. METZGER t
MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS #t
I. INTRODUCTION
A LMOST FROM THE TIME OF ITS ENACTMENT in 1677,1
the Statute of Frauds 2 has been attacked for its tendency to
generate at least as much "fraude and perjurie" as it has prevented.3
And since its enactment, the courts have employed various legal
devices in seeking to minimize the Statute's potential for working
injustice.4 Prominent among these judicially-created doctrines are
promissory estoppel and its predecessor, equitable estoppel. The
use of estoppel principles to circumvent the Statute has been re-
sisted, however, by both courts 5 and commentators 6 contending
principally that this practice would effect the Statute's practical
abrogation. These tensions are amply apparent in the cases dealing
t Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. A.B., Indiana
University, 1966; J.D., Indiana University School of Law, 1969.
-t'Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. B.A., Johns
Hopkins University, 1968; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1973;
LL.M., George Washington University, 1975; S.J.D., George Washington Uni-
versity National Law Center, 1981.
1. For an interesting account of the uncertainty surrounding both the
authorship and the date of enactment of the Statute, see Costigan, The Date,
and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARV. L. REV. 329 (1913). For a
discussion of the various drafts of the bill and the insight they give to inter-
preting the Statute, see Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds
(29 Car. IH c. 3) and Their Authors, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1913).
2. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. II, c. 3.
3. See, e.g., Child v. Godolphin, 21 Eng. Rep. 181 (1723); Stephen 8c
Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 L.Q. REV. 1 (1885);
Sunderland, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 273 (1916).
4. See Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of
Frauds, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 114, 115-16 (1975). "Among [the exceptions to
the strict operation of the Statute] are (1) the doctrine of part performance,
(2) the imposition of constructive trusts, (3) quasi-contracts, (4) the presence of
fraud or mistake, (5) the main purpose rule, (6) the joint obligor rule and
(7) equitable estoppel." Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally 2 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACrS §§ 335-41, 361 (1950); Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in
the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39,
72-75 (1974).
5. See notes 76-93, 119, 125-29 and accompanying text infra.
6. See, e.g., Lilienthal, Judicial Repeal of the Statute of Frauds, 9 HARV.
L. REV. 455 (1896).
(63)
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with the applicability of estoppel principles to situations involving
section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code), a
modernized derivation of the original Statute's provision covering
certain sales of goods.7  This remarkably incoherent body of case
law exhibits considerable judicial confusion both as to the nature
of estoppel doctrine and its applicability to section 2-201.
The intent of this article is to examine the status of estoppel
in section 2-201 cases and to recommend that the use of estoppel in
such cases be expanded. Initially, the original Statute's provision
regarding the sale of goods,8 its successor in the Uniform Sales Act,9
and section 2-201 itself will be described.' Next, the article will
focus on how estoppel principles came to be applied to section
2-201's precursors," followed by a descriptive treatment of section
2-201 case law dealing with estoppel in the Code context. 12 Finally,
the article will conclude with an investigation of the major points
of law and policy upon which any ultimate resolution of estoppel's
application must rest, and with the assertion that the arguments in
opposition to this application are not, on the whole, compelling.13
II. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A. The Original Statute
At the time of the passage of the Statute of Frauds, the law of
contract was in its infancy and little understood.' 4 A great danger
existed that defendants in contract cases would be legally bound to
honor obligations they had never in fact assumed.' 5 The law of
evidence barred the testimony of any persons having an interest in
the outcome of the case, thus excluding any testimony by the
parties. 6 In addition, courts had little control over jury verdicts
since jurors were free to disregard the evidence presented at trial
7. See notes 184-219 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 14-33 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 34-40 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 41-75 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 76-183 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 184-220 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 220-74 and accompanying text infra.
14. See Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of
Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 441 (1931).
15. Id.
16. See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 387-89 (1924).
[VOL. 26: p. 63
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and to base their decision on their own knowledge of the facts.17
These factors tempted plaintiffs "to procure perjured testimony,
and exposed defendants to outrageous liabilities .. 1 8
To protect defendants from the possibility of perjury and "to
curb the power of juries," 19 the authors of the Statute elected to
require written evidence of several classes of contracts and promis-
sory obligations.20 The provision of the Statute of concern here,
section 17, provided:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
that from and after the said four and twentieth day of
June no contract for the sale of any goods, wares and mer-
chandizes, for the price of ten pounds sterling or upwards,
shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept
part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or
give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part of
payment, or that some note or memorandum in writing
of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties to
be charged by such contract, or their agents thereunto
lawfully authorized.
21
The Statute has been a constant source of controversy and the
genesis of an incredible volume of litigation.22 Numerous com-
mentators have long suggested that modern developments in the
17. See id. at 388. Holdsworth explained that
the medieval method of controlling the jury by writ of attaint was
obsolete, the sixteenth and early seventeenth century method of con-
trolling it by fine or imprisonment had been decided by Bushell's Case
to be illegal, and the modern device of getting an order for a new
trial, when the verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence,
was in its infancy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
18. Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427,
430 (1928).
19. Summers, supra note 14, at 458.
20. Most important among the classes were contracts involving an interest
in land (except leases not exceeding three years), promises by an executor or
administrator to answer for damages out of his personal estate, promises by
persons to pay the debts of another, contracts made on consideration of mar-
riage, contracts not capable of execution within one year of their making, and
contracts for the sale of goods of a value exceeding ten pounds. Summers,
supra note 14, at 440-41. For a more extensive summary, see 6 W. HoLDS-
wORTH, supra note 16, at 384-87.
21. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. II, c. 3,
§17.
22. "There is no other statute that has been the source of so much litiga-
tion." J. SMrrH, THE LAw OF FRAUDS 327 (1907).
1980-1981]
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law of evidence 23 and contracts, 24 coupled with the increased con-
trol over jury verdicts exercised by modern courts, 25 have rendered
obsolete the major reasons for its promulgation, and have called for
its repeal. 28 The distinctions embodied in section 17 have been a
special target for criticism, with questions being raised concerning:
both the rationale for the section's differentiation between contracts
for the sale of goods and other types of contracts, 27 and the justifica-
tion for requiring written evidence only of those contracts involving
goods priced above the prescribed monetary limit.
2 8
The most significant criticism of the Statute, however, has been
its potential for creating unjust results. Parties, perhaps due to
ignorance of the Statute or of its applicability to their agreement,
29"
in fact may have entered into an oral agreement whose proof sub-
sequently is barred by their failure to satisfy the Statute's writing
requirement.30 In modern times, defendants probably have used
the Statute more often to avoid performing obligations they will-
ingly assumed than to defend against fictitious agreements fabri-
23. See Stephen & Pollock, supra note 3, at 6 (describing the seventeenth
section of the statute as "a relic of times past when the best evidence on such
subjects was excluded on a principle now exploded").
24. See Willis, supra note 18, at 431. Willis observed that "[i]f our modern
contract law had existed in the seventeenth century, there probably would have-
been no fourth and seventeenth sections of the Statute of Frauds at least." Id.
25. See id. at 430. "[W]ith the control exercised by the courts over juries.
in modern times the danger that juries will hold people liable on promises.
they never made is better protected by such court control than by a Statute of
Frauds .... ." Id.
26. Justice Stephen recommended that "it should be thrown out of the
window-that the 17th section should be repealed, and the cases upon it be
consigned to oblivion." Stephen & Pollock, supra note 3, at 5.
27. See id. at 4-5.
28. One commentator noted:
When the reason for the Statute of Frauds is considered, there cer-
tainly is no good reason . . .for holding that an oral promise to sell
a horse for one dollar under the price limit is good, but that an oral
promise to sell it for one dollar over is bad; .... A man is no more
liable in the one case than in the other to be held on a promise he
never made.
Willis, supra note 18, at 443. Willis observed somewhat humorously that
"[w]hether a limit is set because of the belief that people are more liable to-
lie about large transactions, or because the people who deal in large trans-
actions are more liable to be liars, is also probably not of much importance."
Id.
29. "In the great mass of cases the contracting party is as unconscious of
the existence of the Statute of Frauds as of the pressure of the atmosphere;
.Stephen &Pollock, supra note 3, at 3.
30. As one early critic observed: "The great question in all these cases ...
is not, will some one be held liable on a promise he has never made; but . . -
will some one, because of the Statute, be able to escape liability on a promise
he has made but which he has not put in writing .... Willis, supra note
18, at 539.
[VOL. 26: p. 63,
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cated by perjurious plaintiffs. 31 This potential for injustice has led
to conclusions that the Statute's writing requirement is not well-
-suited to combatting fraud 32 and suggestions that other, more
efficacious, means are available for dealing with the evidentiary
.problems associated with oral agreements.
33
B. The Uniform Sales Act
Despite the heavy criticism, the Statute's writing requirement
has continued to display a measure of vitality in our legal system.
In the sale of goods area, section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act re-
tained the writing requirement for contracts "of the value of five
hundred dollars or upwards," 34 and also adopted the original
31. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-8, at 74 (2d ed, 1980). White and Summers observe:
The possibility that plaintiffs must conjure up forged writings and
perjured oral contracts out of whole cloth is unreal. These plaintiffs
would be most unlikely to survive cross-examination, motions for
directed verdict, and a jury's own scrutiny. But the possibility that
defendants might get out of actual contracts simply for lack of a
signed writing is not unreal at all.
Id.
32. See, e.g., id. "A true 'means to an end' surely should not serve com-
monly as a means to disserve that end either. Yet, centuries of experience and
tons of case law testify that a statute of frauds can be an instrument of perjury
and fraud." Id. (footnote omitted).
33. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 14, at 464 (plaintiff seeking to establish
oral contracts should be held to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of
proof); Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 590, 609 (1965) (defendants should be required to deny the
existence of an oral contract as a prerequisite to raising the Statute as a
defense). See also 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 275, at 13.
34. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 4(1) [hereinafter cited as U.S.A.]. The full text
-of § 4 reads:
(1) A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of
the value of five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable
by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in
action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same,
or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment,
or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale
be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf.
(2) The provisions of this section apply to every such contract or
sale, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to be delivered
at some future time or may not at the time of such contract or sale
be actually made, procured, or provided, or fit or ready for delivery,
or some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or
rendering the same fit for delivery; but if the goods are to be manu-
factured by the seller especially for the buyer and are not suitable for
sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the pro-
visions of this section shall not apply.
(3) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this
section when the buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods,
1980-1981]
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Statute of Frauds' 85 recognition of part payment or part acceptance
as exceptions to the writing requirement. 0 The Sales Act's only
major deviation from section 17 of the Statute was its exemption
of contracts for specially manufactured goods,87 a result which had
already been achieved by judicial decision in some states. 8 Thus,
section 4 of the Sales Act was subject to much the same criticisms as.
the original Statute. Corbin, in commenting on the proposed Uni-
form Commercial Code, looked back on the judicial experience with
section 17 and its Sales Act counterpart and concluded:
1. that belief in the certainty and uniformity in the ap-
plication of any presently existing statute of frauds is a
magnificent illusion; 2. that our existing judicial system is
so much superior to that of 1677 that fraudulent and per-
jured assertions of a contract are far less likely to be suc-
cessful; 3. that from the very first, the requirement of a
signed writing has been at odds with the established habits
of men, a habit of reliance upon the spoken word in in-
creasing millions of cases; [and] 4. that when the courts
enforce detailed formal requirements they foster dishonest
repudiation without preventing fraud; . . . .s
Parliament evidently reached similar conclusions when in 1954 it.
repealed section 17 and all but two of the remaining sections of the
original Statute.
40
C. The Uniform Commercial Code
The authors of the Uniform Commercial Code, however,.
elected to keep "the sprit of '77 alive in section 2-201 of the Code," 41
which provides as follows:
expresses by words or conduct his assent to becoming the owner of
those specific goods.
Id. § 4. For a textual treatment of § 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, see L. VOLD,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES §§ 13-22 (2d ed. 1959).
35. For the pertinent text of the Statute of Frauds, see text accompanying
note 21 supra.
36. See U.S.A. § 4(1); note 34 supra.
37. See U.S.A. § 4(2); note 34 supra.
38. See, e.g., Yoe v. Newcomb, 33 Ind. App. 615, 617-18, 71 N.E. 256,
257-58 (1904) (dictum); Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, 454-55 (1872).
39. Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?,
59 YALE L.J. 821, 829 (1950).
40. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 34.
The writing requirement was retained in the case of contracts for the sale of
land and promises to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another..
Id.
41. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-1, at 51.
[VOL. 26: p. 63
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(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there
is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his au-
thorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient be-
cause it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but
the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph be-
yond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a
writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient
against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of
objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is
received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the require-
ments of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects
is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in
the ordinary course of the seller's business and the
seller, before notice of repudiation is received and
under circumstances which reasonably indicate that
the goods are for the buyer, has made either a sub-
stantial beginning of their manufacture or commit-
ments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court that a contract for sale was made, but the
contract is not enforceable under this provision be-
yond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has
been made and accepted or which have been received
and accepted (Section 2-606).42
The Code's drafters retained the writing requirement "because
they saw it as a means to the end of combatting perjured testimony
in contract cases." 48 They were not unmindful, however, of the
42. U.C.C. § 2-201.
43. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-1, at 51.
1980-1981]
7
Metzger and Phillips: Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
historically demonstrated potential for fraud inherent in a writing
requirement, and included in section 2-201 several features designed
"to make the repudiation of genuine [oral] contracts less likely to
be successful while at the same time in no way increasing the
probability of successful fraud." 44
Subsection 2-201(1) follows the pattern established in the Sales
Act by requiring a writing for contracts involving the sale of goods
"for the price of $500 or more." 45 The retention of a dollar
amount as the functional criterion for the Statute's application ex-
poses the Code to the same criticism previously directed at the Sales
Act and section 17.40 In addition, a study conducted by the Yale
Law Journal (Yale Study), 47 the only extant empirical study of
actual business practice concerning the reduction of oral agreements
to written form, indicates that the dollar amount device may not be
consonant with commercial reality.
48
The major change provided by subsection 2-201(1) is its clear
relaxation of the writing requirement. The three elements neces-
sary to satisfy subsection 2-201(1) are that the writing "indicate that
a contract for sale has been made between the parties," 49 be "signed
by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his author-
ized agent or broker," 5o and indicate the quantity of goods sold.51
The Code also indicates that a writing sufficient to satisfy subsection
44. Corbin, supra note 39, at 829.
45. See text accompanying note 42 supra. Unlike § 4 of the Uniform Sales
Act, U.C.C. § 2-201 does not apply to choses in action. The statute of frauds
for sales of this type is covered by U.C.C. § 1-206.
46. See note 28 supra.
47. The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-Appraisal
in Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE L.J. 1038 (1957).
48. Id. at 1057-58. Only 18% of the 65 firms surveyed regularly delayed
commencing manufacture of orally ordered goods until receipt of written con-
firmation of the order because the order was over the $500 limit. Id. Sixty-
eight per cent indicated their reliance policy was in no way related to the
amount of the order and 6% indicated that the larger the amount, the more
likely they were to act upon an oral order. Id. at 1057.
49. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1 indicates that the writing need only "afford
a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction."
50. U.C.C. § 1-201(39) defines signed as "any symbol executed or adopted
by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Thus, the Code
"deformalizes" the signature requirement. J. WHITE &c R. SUMMERS, supra
note 31, § 2-4, at 59. See, e.g., Automotive Spares Corp. v. Archer Bearings
Co., 382 F. Supp. 513, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (letterhead); A & G Constr. Co. v.
Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207, 1216 (Alaska 1976) (typed name).
51. The requirement of a quantity term stems from section 2-201(l)'s state-
ment that "the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the
quantity of goods shown in such writing." U.C.C. § 2-201(l). Even the quan-
tity term need not be accurately stated, but recovery is limited to the amount
stated. See U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1.
(VOL. 26: p. 63
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2-201(1) need not contain all the material terms of the parties'
agreement, 52 as some earlier cases have required.53 Although neither
the original Statute of Frauds 4 nor the Sales Act 51 expressly re-
quired the incorporation of every material term of the parties'
agreement as a hallmark of a satisfactory writing, courts had en-
grafted this requirement onto the statutory language, "mak[ing] it
possible for a dishonest contractor to admit the making of the con-
tract and yet to repudiate it; indeed, even to go so far as to make
proof themselves of the terms of the contract that they had made in
order to repudiate the very memorandum that they had signed." 56
This form of injustice is no longer possible under the Code.
57
Subsection 2-201(2) seeks to prevent another type of fraud made
possible by the requirement under the Sales Act 58 and section 17 59
that only the party to be charged need sign the writing. Although
it seemed sensible not to require the signature of the moving party
who was willing to testify under oath that a contract existed, this
provision enabled unscrupulous parties who received confirmatory
memoranda from those with whom they dealt to await market de-
velopments before deciding whether to perform under an oral con-
tract of sale.60 For example, if the market price at the time and
place set for delivery of the goods exceeded the contract price, the
seller could refuse to perform and could raise the Statute as a de-
fense. If the market price dropped below the contract price, how-
ever, the seller could enforce the agreement against the buyer because
the latter, having signed the confirmatory memorandum, had no
defense under the Statute. Subsection 2-201(2) reduces this pos-
sibility of fraudulent speculation by denying the protection of the
52. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1 states that the writing need not indicate
which party is the buyer and which party is the seller and may omit such terms
as price, time and place of payment and delivery, the general quality of the
goods, and any particular warranties. White and Summers observe that "the
main theory of the writing sufficient under 2-201(1) is not that it conclusively
proves the existence of the contract but that it affords the trier of fact some-
thing reliable to go on in addition to the mere oral testimony of the plaintiff."
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-4, at 61.
53. See L. VOLD, supra note 34, at 127 & n.27.
54. For the text of the original statute, see text accompanying note 21
supra.
55. For the text of § 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, see note 34 supra.
56. Corbin, supra note 39, at 830-31.
57. On this general point, see the discussion of subsection 2-201(3)(b), at
notes 68-72 and accompanying text infra.
58. For the pertinent text of the Sales Act, see subsection (1), at note 34
supra.
59. For the text of section 17, see text accompanying note 21 supra.
60. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-3, at 55; Edwards,
The Statute of Frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Doctrine of
Estoppel, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 211 (1978).
1980-1981]
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Statute to a merchant 61 who receives such a confirmatory memo-
randum and fails to give "written notice of objection to its contents"
within ten days of receipt. Thus, even though subsection 2-201(1)
requires that an acceptable writing be "signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought," under subsection 2-201(2), such a
writing becomes effective against both parties.62
Subsection 2-201(3) incorporates three provisions that facilitate
the enforcement of an oral contract in the absence of the writing
which would satisfy 2-201(1). Each of these provisions deals with
conduct which evidences the existence of a contract and each, in
varying degrees, prevents fraudulent use of the Statute.63 Subsection
2-201(3)(a) follows the Sales Act approach of exempting specially
manufactured goods from the writing requirement, 4 but differs
from the Sales Act in two significant respects. It is broadened to
include recognition of seller reliance not only by specially manu-
facturing goods but also by making commitments to procure
specially manufactured goods from others. 5 The reliance exception
is narrowed, however, by requiring a substantial change of position
61. Subsection 2-201(2) applies to sales only "between merchants." See
text accompanying note 42 supra. Subsection 2-104(1) defines merchant as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowl-
edge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. §2-104(1). The limitation of subsection 2-201(2) thus recognizes the
business practice of sending confirming memoranda of oral agreements, while
excluding sales of goods between other parties who might not be familiar with
the need to object. See Edwards, supra note 60, at 211.
62. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 3 indicates that the only effect of a failure to
reply to a confirming memorandum is to eliminate the Statute of Frauds de-
fense. The party seeking to enforce the contract still has the burden of proving
that an oral agreement was made prior to sending the written confirmation.
63. White and Summers, in referring to subsections 2-201(3)(a), (b), and
(c), observe:
[E]ach has this in common: it is a kind of special indicator that a con-
tract, albeit oral, was in fact made. Sellers do not produce custom-
made goods just to pass the time of day. Parties do not admit con-
tracts lightly in open court, nor do they ordinarily confer gratuitous
benefits on others, except perhaps at Christmas.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-5, at 65. For a corresponding view
regarding the purpose of the 2-201(1) writing requirement, see note 52 supra.
64. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
65. See text accompanying note 42 supra. The language of the Uniform
Sales Act expressly exempts only contracts where "the goods are to be manu-
factured by the seller especially for the buyer." U.S.A. § 4(2) (emphasis added).
The Code exempts contracts where the seller 'has made either a substantial
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement." U.C.C.
§ 2-201(3)(a). See also Edwards, supra note 60, at 211.
[VOL. 26: p. 63
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by the seller before receiving notice of repudiation by the buyer.06
Clearly, subsection 2-201(3)(a) emphasizes protecting sellers' reliance,
albeit only in situations where their reliance provides good evidence
of the existence of a contract. The Yale Study indicates that few
sellers may benefit from this protection, however, since oral orders
for specially manufactured goods are less likely to induce reliance
than oral orders for stock goods.
67
Subsection 2-201(3)(b) follows the lead of some earlier cases 68
by denying the Statute's protection to parties who admit in their
"pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale
was made." 09 This removes what had previously been one of the
most galling aspects of the Statute's writing requirement: the ability
of a defendant to raise the Statute as a defense while admitting that
he had in fact entered into an oral contract with the plaintiff.70
The language of the subsection apparently still allows a defendant
seeking to avoid a contract he actually made to remain silent with
66. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a). "Under the Sales Act, once it was established that
a contract was for specially manufactured goods, the contract was enforceable
even though manufacturing had not started. The Code modified this principle
by providing that the oral contract is not enforceable unless the seller has
acted in reliance on the oral contract before notice of repudiation is received.
Such reliance strengthens the evidence of a contract." Edwards, supra note
60, at 211. For cases construing § 2-201(3)(a)'s "substantial beginning before
repudiation" requirement, see, e.g., Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436
F. Supp. 409, 414 (N.D. Ohio 1976); LTV Aerospace Corp. v. C.C. Bateman,
492 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
67. Yale Study, supra note 47, at 1057. The Yale Study found that only
15% of the manufacturers surveyed indicated that they were more likely to
start production on an oral order for special goods than for stock goods, 43%
indicated that the reverse was true, and 29% indicated that they made no
distinction in this regard between orders for special or stock goods. Id. Of
course, one can argue that the harm flowing from denying the enforcement of
a contract for special goods is greater than that flowing from a similar denial
in the case of stock goods, and that this alone is enough to justify the excep-
tion for specially manufactured goods. Also, performance with respect to stock
goods is admittedly of less evidentiary value than performance with respect to
special goods.
68. See, e.g., Trossbach v. Trossbach, 185 Md. 47, 42 A.2d 905 (1945) (trust
in land enforceable if admitted in defendant's testimony); Zlotziver v. Zlotziver,
355 Pa. 299, 49 A.2d 779 (1946) (oral agreement enforceable if admitted in
either pleadings or testimony).
69. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b). U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 7 states that after an
admission "the contract is not thus conclusively established. The admission
so made by a party is itself evidential against him of the truth of the facts so
admitted and of nothing more; as against the other party, it is not evidential
at all." For a thorough discussion of the current treatment of both voluntary
and involuntary admissions under § 2-201(3)(b), see generally Note, The Appli-
cation of the Oral Admissions Exception to the Uniform Commercial Code's
Statute of Frauds, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 486 (1980).
70. For example, the oral agreement might be admitted by the defendant
to show that the writing did not contain all the material terms of the contract.
1980-1981]
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impunity concerning its existence.71  It has been noted, however,.
that the language of 2-201(3)(b) is broad enough to prevent a de-
fendant from winning the case at the pleading stage by demurring
to the complaint and appending a sworn affidavit denying the
making of an oral contract, since the subsection contemplates the
possibility of an admission not only in a party's pleading but also
by "testimony or otherwise in court." 72
Subsection 2-201(3)(c), like the Sales Act and section 17, con-
tinues to recognize part payment or part acceptance as sufficient
evidence of the existence of a contract to obviate the need for a
writing.73 Unlike its predecessors, however, 2-201(3)(c) only allows
enforcement of the contract to the extent of the quantity received
or paid for. This narrowing of the part payment/part acceptance
exception protects defendants against fraudulent assertions that the
parties contracted for an amount greater than they had in fact
agreed to.
74
Despite section 2-201's attempts to minimize fraudulent abuses
of the Statute's writing requirement, defendants in cases not falling
within the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the writing require-
ment may still use that requirement to avoid performing contracts
they in fact freely assented to. Such use of the Statute may par-
ticularly harm those innocent plaintiffs who have substantially relied
upon defendants' promises to perform. However, these plaintiffs
may not necessarily be barred from attaining enforcement of their
claims if they assert the doctrine of estoppel, a device which some-
times operated to bar the application of the original Statute of
Frauds and section 4 of the Sales Act. The existing Code cases on
point reflect, however, a great deal of confusion on this issue.75
Before discussing estoppel under the U.C.C., its application to the
Code's predecessors will be examined.
71. White and Summers suggest that a better course would have been to
require that a party invoking the Statute make out at least a prima facie case
that a contract does not exist. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-5,
at 66.
72. Id. at 67. White and Summers acknowledge that such an interpreta-
tion possibly "cuts the heart right out" of the Code's writing requirement, since
plaintiffs who are able to make profitable enough use of cross-examination of
the defendant to get their case to the jury may then in reality get a decision
based on whether the jury believes that the parties in fact had a contract, and
not on the Statute of Frauds issue. Id. California did not adopt 2-201(3)(b)
due to pleading problems and doubts over whether or not defendants could
be compelled thereunder to testify about the existence of a contract. Note,
supra note 33, at 609-10.
73. For the text of U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c), see text accompanying note 42
supra.
74. See Corbin, supra note 39, at 831; Edwards, supra note 60, at 212-13.
75. See notes 184-219 and accompanying text infra.
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III. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A. Equitable Estoppel
In order to limit the harsh effects which can flow from the un-
restricted application of the Statute of Frauds, courts, under the
guise of judicial "interpretation" 76 and through the creation of
numerous exceptions, 77 have steadily eroded the scope of the Statute's
operation.7 8 Courts of equity were the first to employ such de-
vices.79 That equity should intervene to ameliorate the Statute's
operation was consistent with equitable tradition, since the "courts
of equity have always protected a person from the harsh operations
of statutes." 80
76. See 2 A. CORBIlN, supra note 4, at 3. Corbin observed:
Such gain in the prevention of fraud as is attained by the statute
is attained at the expense of permitting persons who have in fact made
oral promises to break those promises with impunity and to cause
disappointment and loss to honest men. It is this fact that has caused
the courts to interpret the statute so narrowly as to exclude many
promises from its operation on what may seem to be flimsy grounds.
Id. See also Note, Statute of Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and
the Statute of Frauds, 66 MicH. L. REV. 170, 171 n.7 (1967).
77. For a list of various exceptions to the Statute, see note 4 supra.
78. Summers, supra note 14, at 442. Summers noted:
How many unjust suits have been prevented as a result of the
statute cannot be estimated, but the reports are filled with cases where
just claims have been defeated by its operation. This has resulted in
a distorting of the statute, in order to prevent injustice, into the most
inconceivable meanings, so that cases might be ruled to fall without
its provisions.
Id.
79. The earliest means employed to avoid the operation of the Statute was
the equitable doctrine of part performance, recognized since the Statute's
enactment.
[T]he statute's framers were thoroughly familiar with the part-perform-
ance problem, and the decisions which shortly after the Statute of
Frauds settled the law that part-performance would make the oral
contract for the sale of land enforceable in chancery, notwithstanding
the statute, are conclusive evidence that its framers never intended the
statute to prevent the giving of equitable relief in the part-performance
cases.
Costigan, supra note 1, at 344.
80. Summers, supra note 14, at 447. Indeed, one prominent historian of
the Statute maintained that it was never intended to apply to the courts of
equity, a view which, if accurate, indicates that the frequently expressed con-
cerns about the abrogation of the Statute by the application of other equitable
doctrines like estoppel may be misplaced. See Costigan, supra note 1, at 343-45.
Costigan reasoned that
[tlhe judges who framed the Statute of Frauds were so anxious to tie
the hands of juries and so possessed by the idea that the statute would
not apply ex proprio vigore to chancery cases that they neglected to
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In cases involving outright fraud, the courts of chancery en-
forced oral contracts within the scope of the Statute under the theory
that it was the supreme duty of equity to prevent fraud.8' Of course,
situations arose which did not involve fraud, but which occasioned
severe hardship for the promisee by denying enforcement of a con-
tract due to its failure to satisfy the Statute. In such cases, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, began to be
recognized as a device for defeating the application of the Statute
on the ground that "the invocation of the statute would allow the
perpetration of a moral fraud." 82 Equitable estoppel operated by
preventing a person "from denying or asserting anything to the
contrary of that which by the person's own deeds, acts, or repre-
sentations has been set forward as the truth." 83 Apparently an
outgrowth of the equitable maxim that "he who has committed
inequity shall not have equity," 84 the use of equitable estoppel to
circumvent the Statute was justified under the rationale that "by
preventing the inequitable use of the Statute of Frauds, the doctrine
of estoppel may be an aid in the ultimate function of the statute in
preventing fraud." 85
81. See Wakeman v. Dodd, 27 N.J. Eq. 564 (1876). The theory in such
cases is that "relief is afforded in equity because of the fraud, and not by virtue
of the contract." Id. at 565 (dictum).
82. Summers, supra note 14, at 446. The classic elements of equitable-
estoppel have been stated as follows:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a
representation or a concealment of material facts.
2. These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his
said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge
of them is necessarily imputed to him.
3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such con-
duct was done, and at the time when it was acted upon by him.
4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the
expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under
such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be
so acted upon....
5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus
relying, he must be led to act upon it.
6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his
position for the worse; ....
3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805, at 191-92 (5th ed.
1941) (emphasis in original). The equitable estoppel test also has been ex-
pressed in terms of whether the promisor's conduct inducing reliance was.
'unconscionable." See L. VOLD, supra note 34, at 93 & n.62. For application
of this test in section 2-201 estoppel cases, see note 201 infra.
83. Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1027, 1041 (1974).
84. Id. at 1040-41.
85. Summers, supra note 14, at 447. Summers and others have argued that
part performance was nothing more than a limited variant of equitable estop-
14
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As a method of protecting the reliance interests of promisees,
however, equitable estoppel was seriously limited by two aspects of
its initial formulation. First, early interpretations of the doctrine
required that plaintiffs prove actual fraudulent intent on the de-
fendant's part.6 By the end of the nineteenth century, however,
most courts required only that plaintiffs prove a misrepresentation
which would "work a fraud" on them if denied.87 More signifi-
cantly though, equitable estoppel has traditionally been held to
apply only to misrepresentations of present or past facts,"" and there-
fore was inapplicable in cases where the promisor's representation
amounted solely to a promise of some future performance.8 9 Initial
applications of the estoppel principle to Statute of Frauds cases,
therefore, only applied where the promisor had misrepresented the
existence of a fact which would have eliminated the necessity for a
writing" or had represented that a writing satisfying the Statute's
requirements had in fact been executed. 9' This distinction between
"facts" and promises was a largely artificial one,92 and was capable
of producing patently unfair results.9
pel. Summers concluded that "the part performance doctrine, long since ac-
cepted, in the last analysis, merely works as an extension of the principles of
equitable estoppel." Id. The doctrines clearly overlap and examples abound
of courts confusing their application. See Note, Part Performance, Estoppel
and the California Statute of Frauds, 3 STAN. L. REV. 281, 282-83 & nn.l1l-15
(1951).
86. See Note, supra note 76, at 174 n.21.
87. See Note, supra note 85, at 290.
88. See Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine,
78 YALE L.J. 343, 376 (1969); Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or
Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913, 914 (1951).
89. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, Inc., 122 Cal.
App. 554, 562-63, 10 P.2d 478, 482 (1932); Fiers v. Jacobson, 123 Mont. 242,
251, 211 P.2d 968, 972-73 (1949); In re Watson's Estate, 177 Misc. 308, 317, 30
N.Y.S.2d 577, 586-87 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
90. See Note, supra note 33, at 595.
91. See Edwards, supra note 60, at 215. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has consistently and "categorically rejected the principle of equitable
estoppel as a means of enforcing oral contracts falling within the Statute's
scope." Note, supra note 76, at 180, citing Polka v. May, 383 Pa. 80, 84, 118
A.2d 154, 156 (1955) ("the principle of estoppel may not be invoked against
the operation of the statute of frauds"). See Borrello v. Lauletta, 455 Pa. 350,
352, 317 A.2d 254, 255 (1974); Beers v. Pusey, 389 Pa. 117, 124, 132 A.2d 346,
350 (1957).
92. Seavey pointed out the difficulty of distinguishing between promises
about the future and representations of present or past facts when he noted
that "every statement of the future includes some statement of present facts."
Seavey, supra note 88, at 922-23. Seavey also observed that "both statements
concerning the future and . . . promises involve representations as to the pres-
ent state of mind of the speaker .... " Id. at 914.
93. It is difficult to justify protecting promisees who rely on misrepresenta-
tions of fact while denying protection to those who rely on promises, since
.1980-1981]
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B. The Rise of Promissory Estoppel in the
Statute of Frauds Context
1. The Doctrine's Early Development
Twentieth century judges were less willing than their nine-
teenth century counterparts to tolerate the injustice that resulted
from denying protection to parties who had relied upon promises.9 4
The traditional view that reliance upon gratuitous promises was
unreasonable seemed to deny reality and to ignore the promisor's
part in inducing such reliance. 5 In order to protect the promisee's
reliance, the estoppel concept was expanded 91 to include reliance
on promises by the development of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
9 7
The origins of the promissory estoppel principle lie in several
classes of cases in which courts protected plaintiffs who had detri-
mentally relied on promisesY8 The first open recognition of the
"harm may result from expectable reliance upon the truth of the one or the
performance of the other, if the representations are false." Id. at 914.
94. Summers, supra note 14, at 448 (footnote omitted). Summers asserted
that "the analytical and historical schools of the past century have given way
to the philosophical and sociological schools of the present and morality has
re-asserted itself in the law." Id. See also G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT 63-64 (1974). Gilmore observed:fM]any judges . . . were not prepared to look with stony-eyed indif-
erence on the plight of a plaintiff who had, to his detriment, relied
on a defendant's assurances without the protection of a formal con-
tract. However, the new doctrine [the bargain test for consideration]
precluded the judges of the 1900 crop from saying, as their predeces-
sors would have said a half-century earlier, that the "detriment" itself
was "consideration." They had to find a new solution, or, at least,
a new terminology. In such a situation the word that comes instinc-
tively to the mind of any judge is, of course, "estoppel" . ..
Id.
95. Seavey, supra note 88, at 924-25. Seavey observed:
Common experience leads us to believe that it is reasonable to rely
on gratuitous promises.... [O]ne who makes a promise intending not
to keep it misrepresents his intent and, as in other cases of deceitful
misrepresentation, it should not be a defense that the defendant suc-
ceeded in taking advantage of the plaintiff's credulity.
Id. See also Henderson, supra note 88, at 373 ("the broad applicability of the
estoppel concept in our law derives from the reaction of judges to the effects
of misleading conduct").
96. Henderson reasons that, given the extant factors favoring increased
protection of reliance interests, it was "inevitable that a rule of promissory
estoppel would develop in recognition of the applicability of the estoppel
principle to promises." Henderson, supra note 88, at 376.
97. The term "promissory estoppel" was apparently first used by Williston.
See I S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139, at 308 (Ist ed. 1921).
98. For an exhaustive treatment of the origins of promissory estoppel, see
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents (pts. I & II), 50 Micn.
L. REV. 639, 873 (1952).
[VOL. 26: p. 63-
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-doctrine came in charitable subscription cases,99 in which courts
generally would enforce a promise which brought about action in
reliance by the promisee.10° Numerous cases also enforced oral
promises to make gifts of land to promisees who subsequently had
taken possession and made improvements, despite the absence of
bargained-for consideration or a writing sufficient to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds.' 0 ' Early application of the promissory estoppel
principle also occurred in cases involving gratuitous bailments, 0 2
gratuitous agency, 103 waivers,? 4 rent reductions, 0 5 and a miscellany
of cases including pensions and bonuses. 06
99. See id. at 644-53.
100. See, e.g., University of S. Cal. v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39, 283 P. 949
(1929) (university began construction of an administration building); Scott v.
Triggs, 76 Ind. App. 69, 131 N.E. 415 (1921) (war chest distributed to various
charities); First M.E. Church v. Howard's Estate, 133 Misc. 723, 233 N.Y.S. 451
(1929) (church purchased land and had an architect design a parish house).
101. See, e.g., Clansky v. Flusky, 187 Ill. 605, 58 N.E. 594 (1900); Greiner
v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930); Evenson v. Aamodt, 153 Minn. 14,
189 N.W. 584 (1922); Royer v. Borough of Ephrata, 171 Pa. 429, 33 A. 361
(1895). Circumvention of the Statute generally was achieved by analogy to the
part performance principle, although part performance technically was applic-
able only to oral contracts to sell land. See Boyer, supra note 98, at 656. See
generally id. at 653-65.
102. Two early English cases, one of which predates the Statute of Frauds,
support the theory of promissory estoppel. See Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep.
107 (1703) (gratuitous bailment of casks of brandy to be delivered to a third
party); Wheatley v. Low, 79 Eng. Rep. 578 (1623) (gratuitous bailment of 10
pounds to be delivered to a third party). See generally Boyer, supra note 98,
at 665-74.
103. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co. v. Evans, 11 N.J. Misc. 19, 163
A. 667 (1932) (mortgagee promised to obtain fire insurance adequate to protect
mortgagor's interest); Barile v. Wright, 256 N.Y. 1, 175 N.E. 351, 245 N.Y.S.
899 (1931) (mortgagee promised to obtain insurance for benefit of mortgagor);
Elam v. Smithdeal Realty R Ins. Co., 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921) (insur-
ance agent promised to obtain car insurance). See generally Boyer, supra note
98, at 873-83.
104. See, e.g., Zarthar v. Saliba, 282 Mass. 558, 185 N.E. 367 (1933) (waiver
of provision in construction contract requiring written change orders); Parish
Mfg. Corp. v. Martin-Parry Corp., 293 Pa. 422, 143 A. 103 (1928) (waiver by
buyer of strict adherence to contract delivery date). Boyer asserted that
[c]haracteristic of [cases involving waiveri is the fact that in each in-
stance the promisee has, in reliance upon the promise not to insist
upon the performance of the condition, neglected or failed to perform
it. Enforcement of the promise to "waive" the condition can be justi-
fied only on the basis of promissory estoppel.
Boyer, supra note 98, at 890 (citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., Win. Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W.
650 (1934) (lessor agreed to reduce rent due to general business depression);
Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 196 A. 39 (1938) (lessee started new business in
reliance on lessor's promise to release him from partnership obligations under
lease). In Fried, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly applied the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel. Id. at 503, 196 A. at 42-43.
106. See, e.g., Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 579, 161
A. 171 (1932), rev'd on other grounds, 318 Pa. 490, 178 A. 490 (1935) (employee
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2. The "Ancillary Promise" Limitation: Promissory Estoppel's Early
Relation to the Statute of Frauds
Although in many early cases promissory estoppel frequently
acted as a substitute for consideration, it soon began to be applied
in the Statute of Frauds area. The turn of the century witnessed a
number of Statute of Frauds cases107 decided under the general
rubric of estoppel which departed from equitable estoppel's
traditional elements. 08  For our purposes, the most significant of
these was the California Supreme Court's decision in Seymour v.
Oelrichs,1 9 a case involving a police captain plaintiff who gave up a
secure position that included pension rights and the right to be
discharged only for cause, to accept a ten-year oral contract to man-
age property for the defendants. 110 One of the defendants, who was
later killed while in Europe, had orally promised the plaintiff to
reduce the parties' agreement to written form upon returning from
the trip."' The Court held that, due to the ancillary promise to
reduce the agreement to writing, the surviving defendants were
estopped from raising the Statute of Frauds as a defense.
1 2
The result in Seymour, though ascribed by the court to the
doctrine of equitable estoppel," 8 may be more appropriately desig-




relied on employer's promise to pay pension). See generally Boyer, supra note
98, at 883-88.
107. See, e.g., Kingston v. Walters, 16 N.M. 59, 113 P. 594 (1911) (seller
orally agreed to extend future payment date of debt); Perkiomen Brick Co. v.
Dyer, 187 Pa. 470, 41 A. 326 (1898) (purchaser orally agreed to subscribe to
stock).
108. For a discussion of the elements of equitable estoppel and their appli-
cation, see notes 82 & 88-93 and accompanying text supra.
109. 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909).
110. Id. at 792, 106 P. at 93. Since the contract was not to be performed
within one year, it was within the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 786, 106 P. at 90.
Ill. Id. at 792, 106 P. at 93.
112. Id. at 799-800, 106 P. at 96. The court was careful to point out that
the plaintiff's part performance of the contract was irrelevant. Id. at 794, 106
P. at 93-94.
113. Id. at 800, 106 P. at 96.
114. The Seymour court recognized that equitable estoppel cases ordinarily
distinguish between misrepresentations of fact and promises to do something in
the future, but concluded that the defendants' promise to reduce the plaintiff's
contract to writing combined with the plaintiff's resignation in full reliance on
the promise justified the application of estoppel in order to prevent a manifest
fraud. Id. at 797-800, 106 P. at 94-96. In commenting on Seymour, Summers
concluded that "[i]t might have been better had the court called it a promissory
estoppel because at the bottom the [misrepresentation of] fact is not there."
Summers, supra note 14, at 454 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that
the California Supreme Court subsequently extended Seymour to promises not
[VCOL. 26: p. 6a,
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The Seymour holding was later sanctioned by a comment in the
Statute of Frauds section of the First Restatement of Contracts."
5
Section 90 of the Restatement 116-the general section concerning
promissory estoppel-however, contained nothing, either in its ex-
press language or in the comments thereto, suggesting any broader
applicability of promissory estoppel in Statute of Frauds cases. Ac-
cordingly, some modern courts have continued to restrict the appli-
cation of promissory estoppel in Statute of Frauds cases to instances
involving ancillary promises to reduce oral contracts to written
form."17 Theoretically, the Statute is only being indirectly defeated
in such a case, since promissory estoppel is being used to enforce an
ancillary promise which is not within the scope of the Statute, and
which is not the underlying obligation.
118
The reluctance of such courts to apply promissory estoppel to
cases not involving ancillary promises may stem from their appre-
hension that broader application of the estoppel doctrine would
result in the complete abrogation of the Statute.119 Any idea that
to rely on the Statute as a defense. See, e.g., Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80,
86-87, 193 P. 84, 87 (1920).
115. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 178, Comment f (1932). Comment
f provides:
Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, an estoppel
may preclude objection on that ground in the same way that objection
to the nonexistence of other facts essential for the establishment of a
right or a defence may be precluded. A misrepresentation that there
has been such satisfaction if substantial action is taken in reliance on
the representation, precludes proof by the party who made the repre-
sentation that it was false; and a promise to make a memorandum, if
similarly relied on, may give rise to an effective promissory estoppel if
the Statute would otherwise operate to defraud.
Id. (emphasis added).
116. Section 90 provides: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character
on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
117. See, e.g., 21 Turtle Creek Square, Ltd. v. New York State Teachers'
Retirement Sys., 432 F.2d 64, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Texas law);
Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz. App. 415, 420-21, 493 P.2d
1220, 1225-26 (1972). The Ninth Circuit concluded that § 90 was not addressed
to the Statute of Frauds but to promissory estoppel as a substitute for con-
sideration, except in the limited circumstance when the promise is to reduce
the contract to writing. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295, 298
(9th Cir. 1954).
118. The end result, of course, is the enforcement of the underlying oral
obligation which did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds requirements. See Note,
supra note 4, at 117; Note, Promissory Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel and
Farmer as a Merchant: The 1973 Grain Cases and the UCC Statute of Frauds,
1977 UTAH L. REV. 59, 74.
119. See Note, Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1219, 1229 (1978).
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the Statute affords promisors in such jurisdictions a significant
degree of protection seems misplaced, however, since a person seek-
ing to perjuriously establish the existence of an oral agreement
Otherwise within the scope of the Statute needs only to prevaricate
concerning the existence of an ancillary oral promise to reduce the
fictitious agreement to writing in order to avoid the Statute's re-
quirements. Fears of the Statute's abrogation have also been a
factor in jurisdictions which refuse to recognize promissory estoppel
as a means for circumventing the Statute under any circumstances.
120
Accepting promissory estoppel would not result in the Statute's
complete abrogation,' 2 ' however, since it would continue to bar the
enforcement of wholly executory oral contracts within its scope, as
well as oral promises which have not occasioned sufficient reliance
by promisees to justify the doctrine's application. Further, even if
promissory estoppel did operate to defeat the Statute and to deprive
promisors of whatever protection the writing requirement affords,
it is doubtful whether this deprivation would amount to a severe
loss. 22  In view of the numerous judicially-created exceptions to
the Statute's operation, 123 a dishonest plaintiff could frequently
"frame" a contract outside the Statute's scope.124
In addition to the contention regarding abrogation of the
Statute, some courts have expressed the related concern that permit-
ting promissory estoppel to circumvent the Statute would amount
to a usurpation of legislative power."25 This argument ignores
several factors discussed previously. Equity has always had the
power to ameliorate the harsh operation of statutes,126 and the
120. See, e.g., Kahn v. Cecelia Co., 40 F. Supp. 878, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);
Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 173 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla.
App. 1965), afi'd, 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966). See also notes 185-91 and accom-
panying text infra.
121. It has been argued that the Statute's writing requirement is only
necessary today if one believes that the judicial fact determination process is
ineffective in reliably determining the existence of an oral agreement. See
notes 23-26 8c 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Summers, supra note 14, at 460. Summers observed that "there
is a very serious doubt as to what protection the statute really does afford.
Despite the lofty words about its glory that are so often pronounced, its pro-
tection, in most cases, is more illusory than real." Id. For a discussion of the
level of protection afforded by the U.C.C.'s writing requirement, see notes
248-56 and accompanying text infra.
123. See note 4 supra.
124. See Summers, supra note 14, at 460.
125. See Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777,
779 (Fla. 1966). For a discussion of this argument in the Code context, see
notes 237-38 and accompanying text infra.
126. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
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estoppel principle, which is as old as the Statute,127 has long been
used to circumvent the Statute's operation. 128 In addition, courts
have played a major role in shaping the Statute's provisions ever
since its enactment,129 a fact which has prompted one prominent
legal historian to observe that "[i]n one sense, the statute of frauds
was hardly a statute at all. It was so heavily warped by 'interpreta-
tion' that it had become little more than a set of common-law rules,
worked out in great detail by the common-law courts." 130 Thus,
the suggestion that allowing promissory estoppel to prevent the
Statute's operation would be an impermissible usurpation of the
legislative function may be based upon a misunderstanding of the
longstanding judicial practice of harmonizing the Statute's language
and common law equitable doctrines.13'
3. Promissory Estoppel and the Statute Today
Restricting the application of promissory estoppel to those cases
involving an ancillary promise to reduce the parties' agreement to
written form ignores one fundamental fact: the promisee who relies
on a promise to perform suffers just as much from the denial of
enforcement as the promisee who relies on a promise to reduce the
agreement to writing.132  In addition, even in ancillary promise
cases, the promisee is, in reality, most likely relying upon the
promise that the underlying agreement will be performed and not
upon the ancillary promise. This fact, however, was not expressly 133
127. See note 79 supra.
128. See notes 76-106 and accompanying text supra.
129. For a discussion of the judicial exceptions to the Statute's operation,
see notes 76-79 and accompanying text supra.
130. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 246-47 (paperback ed.
1973).
131. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19-48, at 738
(2d ed. 1977).
132. The ancillary promise requirement probably serves to obscure the
true basis for preventing the Statute's application to such cases. One court
has observed:
It is appropriate for modern courts to cast aside the raiments of
conceptualism which cloak the true policies underlying the reasoning
behind the many decisions enforcing contracts that violate the Statute
of Frauds. There is certainly no need to resort to legal rubrics or
meticulous legal formulas when better explanations are available. The
policy behind enforcing an oral agreement which violated the Statute
of Frauds [is] a policy of avoiding unconscionable injury ....
McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 29, 35, 469 P.2d 177, 180 (1970) (oral employment
contract for a period of more than one year).
133. In a few cases in the interim between Seymour and Monarco v.
LoGreco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950), courts had stretched the ancillary
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recognized by the courts until the California Supreme Court's de-
cision in Monarco v. Lo Greco.184 In Monarco, a son, relying on
promises by his mother and stepfather to leave him a major portion
of their property, remained at home and worked on the family farm
for twenty years. 185 Shortly before the stepfather died, however, he
changed his will in order to leave his share of the property to a
grandson from a previous marriage.186 The court held that the
plaintiff-grandson was estopped from relying upon the statute of
frauds despite the fact that the case did not fall within the Seymour
ancillary promise exception. 37 Concluding that equitable estoppel
could properly be based upon a promisee's reliance on the promi-
sor's promise to perform his part of their oral agreement, the court
recognized that "[i]n reality it is not the representation that the
contract will be put in writing or that the statute will not be in-
voked, but the promise that the contract will be performed that a
party relies upon when he changes his position because of it." 138
Although the Monarco Court labeled the version of estoppel it ap-
plied as equitable, the decision is plainly based on promissory
estoppel principles. 18 9 The Monarco estoppel rule was subsequently
applied in other jurisdictions expressly recognizing the general
proposition that promissory estoppel can serve to prevent the ap-
plication of the Statute of Frauds. 40
The trend toward allowing promissory estoppel to circumvent
the Statute has gained considerable impetus from the promulgation
of section 217A of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
provides in part:
134. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) (Traynor, J.).
135. Id. at 622, 220 P.2d at 739.
136. Id. at 623, 220 P.2d at 739.
137. Id. at 624-27, 220 P.2d at 740-42. The Monarco court characterized
earlier cases which had refused to recognize estoppel as doing so either because
a restitutionary remedy would adequately compensate the promisee or because
no unconscionable injury would result from nonenforcement of the agreement.
Id. at 623-24, 220 P.2d at 740.
138. Id. at 626, 220 P.2d at 741. After analyzing prior decisions, the court
concluded that whenever unjust enrichment or unconscionable injury would
have resulted from the Statute's application, "the doctrine of estoppel has been
applied whether or not plaintiff relied upon representations going to the re-
quirements of the statute itself." Id.
139. See notes 94-97 and accompanying text supra. But see Note, supra
note 119, at 1221-22, where Monarco is described as allowing proof of detri-
mental reliance sufficient to establish promissory estoppel as a basis for equitable
estoppel. Id. This view is the result of that author's belief that promissory
estoppel can serve only as a consideration substitute. Id. at 1222.
140. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 29, 36-37, 469 P.2d 177, 181
(1970); Alpark Distrib., Inc. v. Poole, 95 Nev. 605, 607-08, 600 P.2d 229, 230-31
(1979).
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(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee or a third person and which does induce the
action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the
Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach
is to be limited as justice requires.
141
In addition to expressly authorizing the application of promissory
estoppel to Statute of Frauds cases, section 217A contains evi-
dentiary 142 and remedial 143 provisions that are likely to enhance
the probability that promissory estoppel will gain wider recognition
and to increase the likelihood that future applications of the doc-
trine will proceed in a more orderly, rational fashion.
Subection 217A(2)(c) directs courts to consider the degree to
which the promisee's reliance or other evidence introduced at trial
corroborates the existence of the alleged oral promise,'4 thus in-
creasing the likelihood that the evidentiary purposes ordinarily
served by the Statute's writing requirement will be satisfied. The
result may be a wider acceptance of promissory estoppel as a device
for circumventing the Statute, since it is likely that some courts have
refused to recognize the doctrine's application because they were, in
fact, unconvinced that the alleged oral agreement between the
parties ever existed.145
Section 217A also addresses the issue of the proper measure of
damages in promissory estoppel cases, a question which has generated
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217A (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7.
1973). Under subsection (1), enforcement of the promise is not mandatory and
subsection (2) reads:
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforce.
ment of the promise, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly
cancellation and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbear-
ance in relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates
evidence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making
and terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing
evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable
by the promisor.
Id. § 217A(2).
142. See notes 144-45 and accompanying text infra.
143. See notes 164-67 and accompanying text infra.
144. For the text of § 217A(2)(c), see note 141 supra.
145. See Note, supra note 118, at 82-83.
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a great deal of confusion and controversy ever since the doctrine
was first formally recognized. As a general rule, promissory estoppel
has not been applied to cases in which injustice could be avoided.
by a quasi-contractual or quantum meruit recovery of the promisee's.
restitution interest.1 4 This rule is based upon the traditional prin-
ciple that equitable relief is only granted when legal remedies are
inadequate, 147 and upon the idea that enforcement of the promise
is unnecessary if justice can be served by returning the promisee to,
the status quo.1 4  A quantum meruit recovery is not always ade-
quate, however, because the promisee's loss of expenditures in reli-
ance will often significantly exceed the value to the promisor of the-
promisee's reliance. 149 In such cases, promissory estoppel properly
finds application.
Despite the fact that, in theory,6 0 promissory estoppel protects
the promisee's reliance interest,'6 ' the majority of courts granting
relief based on the doctrine have awarded damages aimed at pro-
tecting the promisee's expectation interest 162 by fully enforcing the
promisor's promise.153 This treatment is the result of the concept
that promissory estoppel cases are essentially contractual in nature 154
and of the traditional view that reliance-based damages were appro-
priate only in tort actions 151 since contract damages are restricted
146. See Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46.
YALE L.J. 52, 53-54 (1936). A promisee's restitution interest is equal to the
value that the promisee, acting in reliance upon the promisor's promise, has
bestowed upon the promisor. Id. See also Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Re-
quirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. Rav. 459, 485-86
(1950).
147. Note, supra note 33, at 601.
148. Boyer, supra note 146, at 485.
149. Id.
150. See Note, supra note 119, at 1235.
151. A promisee's reliance interest is measured by the value of the prom-
isee's actual change of position in reliance on the promisor's promise. The
objective of awarding such a recovery is to place the promisee in as good a
position as he occupied before the making of the promise. See Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 146, at 54.
152. Expectation awards seek to place promisees in the same position as if
the agreement had been performed. Id.
153. See Note, supra note 4, at 123 and cases cited at n.76 therein.
154. If promissory estoppel is merely utilized in order to substitute a miss-
ing element required by law for a binding contract, then full contractual dam-
ages are theoretically appropriate. Id. at 126, 124 n.77. For a contrasting
analysis, see the discussion of promissory estoppel as an independent theory of
recovery at notes 168-83 and accompanying text infra.
155. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 146, at 90 n.61. Fuller and Perdue
concluded, however, that despite the traditional view, contract damages have
always contained an element of reliance. Id. at 89-96.
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to restitutionary or expectation awards.
156  Also, in some cases an
award of reliance damages may not adequately compensate a
promisee.1 5 7  In such cases it has been argued that a full contract
,damage award "satisfies . . . expectations which have been aroused
-justifiably." 158
In other cases, however, fully enforcing a promise works an in-
-justice on the promisor which would overshadow the loss to the
promisee that would flow from non-enforcement because the value
,of the promisor's promise far exceeds the promisee's reliance
losses.159 The traditional view of promissory estoppel damages
forces courts in such cases to choose between injustices. Faced with
-this unpalatable choice, some courts departed from the traditional
view and awarded reliance-based damages, 160 while others refused
to recognize promissory estoppel's applicability. 16  Numerous com-
mentators have suggested that awarding promisees damages based
.,on their reliance is, in many cases, the preferable approach.
62  It
has also been suggested that limiting promissory estoppel recoveries
to the amount of the promisee's reliance can operate to minimize
-the abrogation of the Statute of Frauds that otherwise flows from
its avoidance through the application of promissory estoppel.
6 3
By recognizing that the "remedy granted for breach is to be
limited as justice requires," 16 section 217A(l) expressly sanctions
156. See, e.g., id. at 89-90; Note, supra note 119, at 1245.
157. This might be true, for instance, where there are extensive lost profits
.resulting from the promisor's failure to perform. See Note, supra note 4, at
129.
158. Boyer, supra note 98, at 663-64 (referring to specific performance of
promises to convey land).
159. See Boyer, supra note 146, at 488-89 (referring to cases involving
promises to secure insurance).
160. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965); Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 696, 133 N.W.2d 267, 274 (1965).
161. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir.
1933); Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 828-32, 268 N.Y.S. 192, 194-98
.(1933).
162. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 146, at 497. Boyer suggested that "[i]n
many cases, partial enforcement will prevent injustice to the promisee without
the injustice to the promisor that is often patent when complete enforcement
-is granted." Id.
163. See Note, supra note 119, at 1242. According to this view, limiting
promisees to reliance-based recoveries avoids injustice to them without the
.complete circumvention of the Statute that results from a full expectation
award. Promisees who fail to have their agreements reduced to written form
.are, therefore, penalized by the denial of a full contract recovery. Thus, the
-Statute would continue to encourage knowledgeable promisees to comply with
-the writing requirement. Id.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217A(l) (Tent. Drafts Nos.
-1-7, 1973).
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the option of partially enforcing the promise under promissory
estoppel theory and provides the flexibility needed to confront the
remedial dilemmas discussed above.'65 For instance, while a com-
ment to section 217A expressly recognizes the possibility of a reli-
ance-based recovery, 168 the same comment also seems to indicate
that full enforcement of the promisor's promise may be the pre-
ferred remedy in most Statute of Frauds cases. 16 7 In thus providing
for a necessary degree of discretion on the question of damages,
section 217A has removed a major obstacle from the path toward
broader recognition of promissory estoppel as a device for barring
the operation of the Statute.
C. The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent
Theory of Recovery and its Implications for the
Statute of Frauds
Promissory estoppel's increasing application in the Statute of
Frauds context has been paralleled in other areas of contract law.
Traditionally, the doctrine has served only as a "consideration sub-
stitute," 168 but recent cases have applied promissory estoppel to
failed contract negotiations 169 and indefinite agreements. 70 Ap-
165. Subsection 217A(2) lists five circumstances which are significant in
determining whether or not the promise should be enforced. For the text of
217A(2), see note 141 supra.
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §217A, Comment d (Tent.
Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). Comment d provides in pertinent part: "In some cases
it may be appropriate to measure relief by the extent of the promisee's reliance
rather than by the terms of the promise." Id.
167. Id. Comment d states that "when specific enforcement is available
under the rule stated in § 197, an ordinary action for damages is commonly
less satisfactory, and justice then does not require enforcement in such an
action." Id. This apparent preference for the contractual remedy is probably
due to the fact that most cases occurring under Section 217A will plainly in-
volve the existence of a contract, unlike some of the more controversial cases
to which § 90 has recently been applied.
168. See notes 94-97 & 117 and accompanying text supra.
169. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d
267 (1965). In Hoffman, the defendant, through various agents, orally agreed
to build and stock a store in consideration of the plaintiff's $18,000 investment.
Id. at 686, 133 N.W.2d at 269. In reliance thereon, the plaintiff sold his bakery
business, purchased the site for the new store, and made various incidental
expenditures. Id. The deal later fell through prior to any written franchise
agreement. Id. at 691, 133 N.W.2d at 271. The Hoffman court granted relief
by applying promissory estoppel, despite the fact that the negotiations between
the parties were not comprehensive enough to satisfy traditional requirements
for a contractual offer. Id. at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275. For a full discussion
of Hoffman, see Henderson, supra note 88, at 358-60; 51 CORNELL L.Q. 351
(1966).
170. Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965). In Wheeler, a contract
to secure a loan was held unenforceable because it failed to contain certain
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parently abandoning the classical contract requirement that liability
be founded upon definite expressions of mutual assent, 171 these de-
cisions utilize promissory estoppel as a method of curing deficiencies
in the offer and acceptance.172 If this trend continues, reliance-based
estoppel tests could replace the traditional contract standards for
determining liability. 73 This development could lead to "con-
tractual" liability being determined by a single promissory estoppel
test, since there would be little practical difference between apply-
ing promissory estoppel independently to each element of a contract
and applying it to the contract as a whole. 74 In line with this
reasoning, and reflecting the views of commentators who have sug-
gested that the reliance principle may be a basis of recovery sepa-
rate from the contract, 75 some courts have recently treated prom-
issory estoppel as a discrete theory of recovery and have discussed
liability under reliance doctrine without any admixture of contract
principles.re The continuation of this trend may eventually lead
essential elements regarding repayment and interest. Id. at 95. Despite the
lack of a contract, the court applied promissory estoppel and allowed recovery
for reliance damages. Id. at 97.
171. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 131, § 2-1, at 22.
172. For a suggestion that promissory estoppel might also come to displace
the contract statute of limitations and the parol evidence rule, see G. GILMORE,
supra note 94, at 66.
173. Allowing promissory estoppel to substitute for the offer, the considera-
tion, and the writing required by the Statute of Frauds obviously has already
diminished the force of traditional contract rules.
174. This would not be the case, of course, if the estoppel tests differed
depending on the contractual element being displaced.
175. See Seavey, supra note 88, at 926. Seavey stated:
Estoppel is basically a tort doctrine and the rationale of the section
[§ 90] is that justice requires the defendant to pay for the harm caused
by foreseeable reliance upon the performance of his promise. The
wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the promised
reward but in causing the plaintiff to change position to his detriment.
Id. See also Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARV. L. REV. 222, 225 (1891)
(gratuitous undertakings should be classified as a separate area of personal rights
distinct from tort and contract); Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM.
L. REV. 799, 811 (1941) (promissory estoppel characterized as "not 'upholding
transactions', but healing losses caused through broken faith"). Fuller also
observed, with considerable foresight, that "occasionally reliance may appear as
a distinct basis of liability, excluding the necessity for any resort to the notion
of private autonomy." Id.
176. See Debron Corp. v. National Home Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352
(8th Cir. 1974) (applying Missouri law). In Debron, a general contractor and
subcontractor orally agreed to terms which were included in the general con-
tractor's bid. Id. at 354. After the general was awarded the contract, the sub
refused to perform. Id. at 355. Before trial, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed
its contract claim, and the court held, nonetheless, that promissory estoppel
could serve as a basis for a separate cause of action and that such a suit did
not require proof of all of the elements necessary to a contract action. Id. at
357-58. See also Allen v. A.G. Edwards &c Sons, 606 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1979)
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to what Grant Gilmore has called the "Death of Contract." 177 Even
if this does not happen, however, the traditional contract framework
will surely be affected by the future evolution of estoppel doctrine,
and promissory estoppel itself tends to reflect and embody certain.
trends in twentieth century contract law.'
78
Recognition of promissory estoppel as an independent theory
of recovery has also occurred in cases involving the Statute of
Frauds. Recent decisions suggest that promissory estoppel claims
are not barred by the Statute because they are not contractually
based, and therefore are beyond the Statute's scope. 79 Such cases,
obviously represent a significant departure from the traditional
reasoning which circumvents the Statute by enforcing an otherwise
valid contract in order to prevent the injustice that would flow
(applying Florida law to an oral promise concerning a brokerage contract);
Northwestern Bank of Commerce v. Employer's Life Ins. Co. of America, -
Minn. -, -, 281 N.W.2d 164, 164-66 (1979) (oral promise to notify assignee
bank of premium default on life insurance policy).
177. See G. GILMORE, supra note 94. Gilmore termed the bargain-based
classical contract framework and the reliance-oriented promissory estoppel
theory as "Contract and anti-Contract." Id. at 61. He further noted:
The most recent, and quite possibly the most important, develop-
ment in the promissory estoppel or § 90 cases has been the suggestion
that such contract-based defenses as the Statute of Frauds are not ap-
plicable when the estoppel (or reliance) doctrine is invoked as the
ground for decision. This line, if it continues to be followed, may
ultimately provide the doctrinal justification for the fusing of contract
and tort in a unified theory of civil obligation. . . . By passing
through the magic gate of § 90, it seems, we can rid ourselves of all
the technical limitations of contract theory .... If we manage to get
that far, the absurdity of attempting to preserve the nineteenth cen-
tury contract-tort dichotomy will have become apparent ....
Id. at 90 (footnotes omitted). Assuming that this ever comes to pass, the
residual area left to be covered by ordinary contract principles is obviously
quite unclear. See id. at 72-90. Gilmore has suggested that the "wholly execu-
tory exchange where neither party has yet taken any action would seem to be
the only situation in which it would be necessary to look to [classical bargain
theory]." Id. at 72.
178. For a discussion of the tendency toward contract rules of some open-
endedness and amenability to discretionary application, see R. UNGER, LAW IN
MODERN SOCIETY 193-94, 196 (1976). See also U.C.C. § 2-204(l) (contract may
be formed "in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct");
§ 2-204(3) (contract will not fail solely because terms have been left open);
§ 2-206 (acceptance in any manner reasonable, including beginning perform-
ance).
179. See, e.g., Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 277-80 (7th Cir.
1979) (applying Wisconsin law) (considering recovery based on promissory estop-
pel despite dismissal of a contract claim barred by the Statute of Frauds); R.S.
Bennett 8c Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., Inc., 606 F.2d 182, 188 (7th Cir.
1979) (applying Illinois law) (permitting assertion of promissory estoppel not-
withstanding the Statute's bar to contract recovery); N. Litterio & Co. v.
Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736, 738-40 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (noting that the
lack of a contractual obligation based on an oral agreement did not dispose
of the promissory estoppel question).
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from the Statute's operation. 80 Of course, it can be argued that
there is little practical difference between allowing promissory
,estoppel to serve as a substitute for the Statute and using it as an
independent theory of recovery, since the tests employed should be
the same in either instance. But the trend toward making prom-
issory estoppel an independent theory of recovery could have a
definite impact on those courts seeking to avoid the Statute's often
harsh and unjust results, but troubled by the apparent abrogation
of the Statute and disregard of legislative will that circumvention
via estoppel arguably entails.' 8' With the availability of promissory
estoppel as an independent cause of action, such courts have an
obvious, if rather technical, escape device: to verbally proclaim the
Statute's continuing vitality when applied to contractual claims, but
to treat it as inapplicable to an estoppel-based attempt at recovery. 82
This reasoning could be buttressed by noting that the reliance re-
quired for successful invocation of promissory estoppel theory helps
to fulfill the evidentiary purposes traditionally associated with the
Statute. 83
IV. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND SECTION 2-201
A. The Cases
One operating without the dubious benefit of having perused
the extant cases might assume that the application of promissory
estoppel to section 2-201 of the Code was proceeding apace with its
increasingly broad acceptance elsewhere. Since section 2-201 is
fundamentally similar to its predecessors, the same arguments that
justified the circumvention of section 17 of the original Statute and
section 4 of the Sales Act by equitable and promissory estoppel
should apply equally to section 2-201.184 The cases demonstrate,
however, that a substantial amount of judicial confusion exists con-
cerning not only the applicability of promissory estoppel to cases
under the Code, but also the distinction between equitable and
180. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
181. For discussion of abrogation of the Statute and disregard of legislative
will, see notes 119-31 and accompanying text supra.
182. Cf. Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 278-79 (7th Cir. 1979)
<raising the Statute in the contract context but not in the estoppel context).
183. See notes 144-45 and accompanying text supra. See also Summers,
.supra note 14, at 459-60 ("it is almost inconceivable that anyone should ma-
terially change his position, so as to satisfy all the elements of an estoppel, on
the expectation of recouping himself on a 'framed' contract").
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promissory estoppel. This section of the article presents an over-
view of the cases in point, followed by a discussion of the major
issues they raise.
To begin, the courts differ significantly on whether or not
estoppel should be applicable at all in the section 2-201 context.
Several courts, employing a variety of arguments, have precluded
recourse to estoppel where section 2-201 applies. 8 5 Perhaps the
primary theory of exclusion is the literalistic assertion that section
2-201 does not by its terms allow recourse to any form of estoppel,
and that the specifically listed exceptions are a complete statement
of the conditions 186 under which the Statute of Frauds can be
avoided.8 7 Also prominent is the familiar assertion 188 that to
allow estoppel to operate in the 2-201 context would effectively
negate the Statute. 8 9 Courts also rely, without much analysis or
discussion of policy, upon prior case law holding that no estoppel-
type exception to the Statute of Frauds will be recognized.19
Finally, in situations where prior state authority supports the use
of estoppel in the Statute of Frauds context, some courts distinguish
such precedents as occurring before enactment of the Code or as
not involving the sale of goods.' 9' Significantly, none of these courts
even mentions section 1-103 of the Code, which in relevant part
provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, including . . . the law rela-
tive to . . . estoppel . . . shall supplement its provisions." 192
Nor do these courts discuss the numerous decisions which explicitly
185. Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, Inc., 463 F.
Supp. 543, 552-54 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111-12, 289
So. 2d 609, 613 (1974); C.G. Campbell & Son v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40,
40-41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). See also Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196
Neb. 538, 543, 244 N.W.2d 86, 89-90 (1976) (equitable exception where fraud
is present but not merely reliance to one's detriment).
186. See notes 58-74 and accompanying text supra. For the text of § 2-201,
see text accompanying note 42 supra.
187. See, e.g., Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111-12, 289 So. 2d 609 613 (1974);
C.G. Campbell & Son v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 40-41 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979).
188. See notes 119-22 and accompanying text supra.
189. See, e.g., Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111-12, 289 So. 2d 609, 613 (1974);
Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 542-45, 244 N.W.2d 86, 90
(1976).
190. See Ivey's Plumbing 8 Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, Inc., 463
F. Supp. 543, 552-54 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (applying Mississippi law); Cox v. Cox,
292 Ala. 106, 111-12, 289 So. 2d 609, 613 (1974).
191. See C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 856-57
(9th Cir. 1977); C.G. Campbell & Son v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 41
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
192. U.C.C. § 1-103.
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rely on section 1-103 as a basis for allowing the potential use of
estoppel in situations governed by section 2-201.193
Despite these exceptions, the substantial weight of extant au-
thority supports the proposition that some form of estoppel is ap-
plicable to section 2-201 cases. Although a few of the cases involve
only the older equitable version of estoppel, 94 the tendency, es-
pecially pronounced in recent cases, has been to label the type of
estoppel employed as promissory. 195 In addition, some courts have
concluded that both promissory and equitable estoppel apply. 96
From a plaintiff's standpoint, promissory estoppel is obviously the
preferable doctrine as it does not necessitate the more stringent.
proof of the misrepresentation of fact required by equitable
estoppel.1
97
If one or both forms of estoppel are applicable to the U.C.C.
Statute of Frauds, what remains to be examined is the actual impact
of estoppel as a practical device for avoiding the Statute. At this.
writing, estoppel has been employed successfully-either in uphold-
ing a lower court judgment or as a basis for remand-in about one-
half of the reported cases involving its application in the 2-201
context. 98 This split in the courts' use of estoppel doctrines is
193. See, e.g., Warder &: Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339,
341-42 (Iowa 1979); Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 177-79, 547
P.2d 323, 329 (1976); Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305
Minn. 324, 326-27, 232 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975); Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Cole,
239 N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D. 1976); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86,
91-93, 238 N.W.2d 290, 293-94 (1976).
194. See, e.g., Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 548-50,
369 A.2d 1017, 1029 (1977); Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson,
305 Minn. 324, 326-27, 232 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975). See also Farmers Elevator
Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 93-94, 238 N.W.2d 290, 293-94 (1976) (applying
equitable estoppel but also noting the possibility of promissory estoppel).
195. See, e.g., Jenkins & Boller Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works, Inc., 36 Ill.
App. 3d 1044, 1046-48, 344 N.E.2d 275, 277 (1976); Meylor v. Brown, 281
N.W.2d 632, 634-35 (Iowa 1979); Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171,
176-80, 547 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1976); Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb,
246 N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (N.D. 1976); Darrow v. Spencer, 581 P.2d 1309, 131Z
(Okla. 1978).
196. R.S. Bennett Sc Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., Inc., 606 F.2d
182, 186-89 (7th Cir. 1979); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz.
App. 415, 419-20, 493 P.2d 1220, 1224-25 (1972); Del Hayes Sc Sons v. Mitchell,
304 Minn. 275, 281-86, 230 N.W.2d 588, 593-95 (1975); Wilke v. Holdredge
Coop. Equity Exch., 200 Neb. 803, 804-06, 265 N.W.2d 672, 674-75 (1978).
197. See notes 87-91 and accompanying text supra. See also J. CALAMARI
Sc J. PERILLO, supra note 131, § 11-34, at 445.
198. R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., Inc., 606 F.2d 182,
186-89 (7th Cir. 1979); Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co.,
541 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1976); Jenkins Sc Boller Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works, Inc.,
36 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1046-48, 344 N.E.2d 275, 277 (1976); Meylor v. Brown,
281 N.W.2d 632, 634-35 (Iowa 1979); Warder Sc Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten,
274 N.W.2d 339, 341-44 (Iowa 1979); Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan-
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further reflected in the manner in which legal standards for each
form of estoppel are verbalized. Historically, the various suggested
tests for applying equitable estoppel have always been fairly com-
plex and confusing I" and the relevant section 2-201 cases also differ
somewhat in the standards they prescribe.20 In dealing with the
,common element of reliance by the promisee, some courts emphasize
the promisee's conduct by requiring "unconscionable hardship and
loss," 201 while other courts emphasize the promisor's conduct by
-requiring fraudulent behavior.202  Most of the equitable estoppel
.decisions 203 state the traditional "past or present fact" test, 204 al-
though one decision appears not to require this element. 205 Finally,
one so-called "equitable estoppel" decision appears to deviate sub-
stantially from the traditional format by framing its test in a fashion
more akin to promissory estoppel.206
In the promissory estoppel cases involving section 2-201, similar
confusion exists concerning the standards to be applied. Some
courts 207 have relied on a strict construction of section 90 of the
171, 176-80, 547 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1976); Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co.,
279 Md. 531, 548-50, 369 A.2d 1017 (1977); Fairway Mach. Sales Co. v. Con-
tinental Motors Corp., 40 Mich. App. 270, 272, 198 N.W.2d 757-58 (1972);
.Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736, 740-42 (N.D.
1976); Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373, 378-79 (N.D. 1974); Farmers
Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 91-93, 238 N.W.2d 290, 293-94 (1976).
199. See, e.g., note 77 supra.
200. Compare Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 92, 238 N.W.2d
'290, 293 (1976) (requiring promisee's reliance to result in "unconscionable
hardship and loss") with Del Hayes & Sons v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 284-86,
230 N.W.2d 588, 595 (1975) (requiring promisor's conduct to be "akin to
fraud"). See also notes 201-06 and accompanying text infra.
201. Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 92, 238 N.W.2d 290,
293 (1976), quoting Federal Land Bank v. Matson, 68 S.D. 538, 541, 5 N.W.2d
314, 315 (1942).
202. Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324,
326-27, 232 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975); Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d
:808, 813 (N.D. 1976).
203. See, e.g., Del Hayes & Sons v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 284-86, 230
N.W.2d 588, 594-95 (1975); Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808, 813
. N.D. 1976).
204. See notes 88-93 and accompanying text supra.
205. Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 91-92, 238 N.W.2d 290, 293
L(1976).
206. Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373, 378 (N.D. 1974). The North
Dakota Supreme Court stated in Dangerfield that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may be applied when: 1) one party relies on another's representation
and changes his position or otherwise suffers an unjust or unconscionable injury
or loss; or 2) where one party has accepted performance or benefits to the
,detriment of another. Id. at 378.
207. See, e.g., Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz. App. 415,
420-21, 493 P.2d 1220, 1225-26 (1972); Del Hayes & Sons v. Mitchell, 304 Minn.
:275, 282 n.6, 230 N.W.2d 588, 593 n.6 (1975).
[VOL. 26: p. 63
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss1/2
U.C.C. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
First Restatement of Contracts; 208 others have varied the test in
minor, but significant, ways; 209 and still others have adopted ele-
ments more appropriate to equitable estoppel. 210 One court,211 on
the other hand, has moved in the opposite direction by expressly
adopting section 217A of the Second Restatement.
21 2
In addition to the considerations concerning the standards.
for applying either equitable or promissory estoppel, some of the
2-201 cases impose additional general requirements. The most sig-
nificant of these decisions are those confining the application of
estoppel to instances where there has been either an ancillary
promise to reduce the oral agreement to writing or a representation
that there has been compliance with the Statute.213 Both require-
ments were originally established in section 178 of the First Re-
statement.214 Also, many courts state that, before estoppel can be
invoked, the oral contract must be proven to some degree of cer-
tainty by competent evidence.215 On the other hand, one court has.
contradicted this assertion by declaring that promissory estoppel
cannot apply where an actual contract exists.216 A few decisions
state that, for estoppel to operate, the conduct of the promisor must
208. For the text of § 90, see note 116 supra.
209. See, e.g., Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 178-79, 547
P.2d 323, 329 (1976) (requiring that the promisor intend and reasonably expect
that the promise will be relied upon, and that the promisee act reasonably in
relying); Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 545, 244 N.W.2d
86, 90 (1976) (limiting § 90 to unilateral informal contracts where consideration
is lacking).
210. See Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736,.
740-42 (N.D. 1976); Darrow v. Spencer, 581 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Okla. 1978).
211. See Meylor v. Brown, 281 N.W.2d 632, 635 (Iowa 1979). See also
Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Iowa 1979).
212. For the text of section 217A, see note 141 and accompanying text
supra.
213. C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 856-57 (9th
Cir. 1977) (applying California law); Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank Kasmir
Assoc., 470 F. Supp. 1176, 1179-80 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (applying Texas law);
Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 543,
552-54 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (applying Mississippi law and relying on C.R. Fedrick
since applicable Mississippi and California codes are identical); Tiffany, Inc.
v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz. App. 415, 420-21, 493 P.2d 1220, 1225-26-
(1972); Del Hayes & Sons v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 281-86, 230 N.W.2d 588,
593-94 (1975).
214. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 178, Comment f. For the text of
§ 178, Comment f, see note 115 supra.
215. Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa
1979); Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 178-79, 547 P.2d 323, 329-30
(1976); Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373, 378 (N.D. 1974); Farmers,
Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 92, 238 N.W.2d 290, 293 (1976); H. Molsen &
Co. v. Hicks, 550 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).




Metzger and Phillips: Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEw[
amount to more than a mere refusal to perform. 217  Standing in
contrast to the conflicting authority as to when estoppel may be
employed as a "substitute" for compliance with Statute of Frauds
requirements are two cases based on Illinois law in which estoppel
was apparently used as an independent theory of recovery.218
A vast degree of doctrinal disarray is obviously revealed in the
cases dealing with the use of estoppel to avoid section 2-201.219
These decisions run the gamut from an outright refusal to recognize
any form of estoppel, at one extreme, to using promissory estoppel as
an independent theory of recovery to which the Statute does not
apply, at the other. This situation clearly cries out for definitive
resolution and, in an attempt to meet this need, we now turn to
our arguments for making promissory estoppel available to defeat
the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds.220
B. Should Promissory Estoppel Apply to Cases Under
U.C.C. Section 2-201?
One of the most common arguments against applying promis-
sory estoppel to cases arising under section 2-201 is that the express
.enumeration of various methods 221 for satisfying the Statute without
the writing required by subsection 2-201(1) 222 impliedly precludes
217. See, e.g., Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 178-79, 547
P.2d 323, 330 (1976); Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 543,
244 N.W.2d 86, 90 (1976). The position taken by these courts appears to be
equivalent to the "fraud or unconscionable conduct" requirement discussed in
note 82 and accompanying text supra.
218. R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus. Inc., 606 F.2d 182,
186-89 (7th Cir. 1979); Jenkins 8: Boiler Co. v. Schimdt Iron Works, Inc., 36
Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1047-48, 344 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1976). Cf. Robert Johnson
Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976) (trial
,court improvidently granted summary judgment for defendant since evidence
failed to conclusively establish that the oral contract would have been enforce-
able despite the Statute). Concerning the significance of this trend, see notes
168-83 and accompanying text supra.
219. For an attempt to organize some of these cases by Restatement
§ 217A(2) criteria, see Note, supra note 118, at 82-83.
220. In the next subsection, we will not devote great attention to the form
,of estoppel, promissory or equitable, that we regard as preferable. Also, we
will not attempt to specify the appropriate tests for each form of estoppel,
though we tend to favor the Restatement § 217A framework. Finally, we will
not discuss the implications of the nascent emergence of promissory estoppel
as an independent theory of recovery, since this development is as yet too
conjectural and limited in its practical impact. See notes 168-83 and accom-
panying text supra. What we will do in the next subsection is to focus on the
validity of the traditional arguments for denying estoppel's applicability as a
means of avoiding the Statute of Frauds.
221. See U.C.C. § 2-201(2), (3). For the text of these subsections, see text
accompanying note 42 supra.
222. For the text of subsection 2-201(1), see text accompanying note 42
.supra.
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;the Statute from being avoided in some other manner. 223  This
:argument is premised upon the familiar maxim of statutory con-
struction, expressio unius, est exclusio alterius.224  The expressio
unius idea has been attacked, 225 however, and the fact that both
-section 17 of the original Statute 228 and section 4 of the Sales Act 227
also contained expressly enumerated exceptions to their operation
did not prevent numerous courts from barring their operation by
the estoppel device. Indeed, the fact that numerous courts recog-
nized either equitable or promissory estoppel as methods of circum-
venting the Statute prior to the Code and, therefore, were likely to
rule in similar fashion concerning section 2-201, militates against
the notion that the authors of the section had any intent to forestall
.a continuance of this judicial practice. Rather than manifesting
a clear negative intent in either the section or its comments, they
chose to remain silent on the issue.22 This argument is reinforced
by section 1-103,229 which authorizes the utilization of estoppel in
Code cases.
In fact, the authors believe that section 1-103 standing alone
is sufficient to dispose of the issue at hand. Not only does it allow
223. See Edwards, supra note 60, at 218. The author stated:
It cannot be gainsaid: the Statute sets forth specific methods of com-
pliance. Estoppel, in any form, has the effect of creating a method
which is not recognized by the legislature. Indeed, the usual rule of
statutory construction would suggest that since specific methods for
satisfying the Statute are expressly provided for, other methods are
therefore intended to be excluded.
Id. See also C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 858 (9th
Cir. 1977) (Duniway, J., concurring); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111, 289 So. 2d
609, 613 (1974); C.G. Campbell & Son v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 41
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
224. Enumeration of specific items impliedly excludes all others. See
United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 58-59 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (interpreting
statute relating to applications for authorization of wiretaps).
225. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 873-74
.(1930). Radin argued:
The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another is in direct contradiction to the habits of speech of most
persons. To say that all men are mortal does not mean that all
women are not, or that all other animals are not. There is no such
implication, either in usage or in logic, unless there is a very particular
emphasis on the word men. It is neither customary nor convenient
to indicate such emphasis in statutes, and without this indication, the
first comment on the rule is that it is not true.
.d. (emphasis in original). See also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC,
482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
226. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
227. See note 34 supra.
228. See Edwards, supra note 60, at 221.
229. For the text of section 1-103, see text accompanying note 192 supra.
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courts that are so inclined to apply estoppel principles to section
2-201 cases, but it also arguably allows incorporation of the other
judicially-created exceptions to the Statute's operation.23 0 Nor is
section 1-103 solely retrospective in operation.2 31  Thus, legal de-
velopments subsequent to the Code's creation and enactment, like
section 217A of the Second Restatement,23 2 may be properly incor-
porated into Code decisions under the aegis of section 1-103.23&
Additional statutory support for the application of estoppel prin-
ciples to cases involving section 2-201 may be found in section 1-203
of the Code,234 which imposes an obligation of good faith in the
performance and enforcement of every contract and duty under
the Code. 23 5  It has been said that, in conjunction, sections 1-103
and 1-203 "authorize the use of estoppel concepts against a party
who unjustifiably misleads another party, however innocently.
These provisions may also be used to combat the defendant who
otherwise acts in bad faith or fraudulently in setting up the statute,
as a defense." 236 Additionally, the language of section 1-103 would
appear to negate the concern traditionally expressed by courts re-
luctant to allow promissory estoppel to circumvent the Statute-
that to do so would amount to a usurpation of the legislative
prerogative. 237 As previously observed, this argument was probably
misconceived even when applied to the Code's predecessors, 238 and,
in the face of the section's clear statement that the Code can be
230. White and Summers observed:
At the time of the Code's general reception, courts had carved out
other exceptions to the writing requirements of pre-Code statutes of
frauds. According to some courts, a party cannot invoke the statute
actually to perpetrate a fraud, nor can a party invoke the statute if
the elements of an equitable estoppel could be shown against him.
These exceptions survive enactment of the Code.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-3, at 56 (emphasis added) (footnotes.
omitted). See also note 255 infra.
231. "What the section [1-103] invites is not limited to law which exists as.
of the date of particular enactments of the Code." Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 197 n.9 (1968).
232. For the text of § 217A, see note 141 and accompanying text supra.
233. The Code itself provides no guidelines for the supplementation of its
provisions by the incorporation of equitable principles. For one commentator's
suggestions, see Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 906, 945-46 (1978).
234. U.C.C. § 1-203 provides: "Every contract or duty within this Act im-
poses an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
235. Id.
236. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-6, at 70 (footnote omitted).
237. See Note, supra note 76, at 182; notes 125-31 and accompanying text-
supra.
238. See notes 126-30 and accompanying text supra.
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supplemented with general equitable principles, it loses whatever
vestiges of authority it had previously retained.
A second frequently expressed judicial concern about allowing
promissory estoppel to bar the Statute's operation is that doing so
results in the practical abrogation of the Statute.239 This position
focuses primarily on the evidentiary function of the writing required
by the Statute. The assertion is that if reliance is allowed to justify
-circumventing the Statute's operation, promisors lose the protection
afforded them by the writing requirement. 240 This argument gives
insufficient credence to the previously noted evidentiary value of
reliance, 241 and to the ability of modern courts to detect and com-
bat perjury.242 It also overlooks the fact that the Code itself ex-
pressly recognizes the evidentiary value of reliance in subsection
.2-201(3)(a) regarding contracts for specially manufactured goods,
243
in subsection 2-201(3)(c) regarding part payment or part accept-
.ance,244 and in subsection 2-209(4),245 which allows an oral modifi-
-cation of a sales contract that fails to satisfy the Statute to "operate
as a waiver." 246 Admittedly, the more generalized reliance con-
239. See notes 119-24 and accompanying text supra.
240. See Edwards, supra note 60, at 220.
241. See notes 144-45 & 183 and accompanying text supra.
242. See notes 25 & 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
243. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text supra.
244. See notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
245. U.C.C. § 2-209 states:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission ex-
cept by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded,
but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form sup-
plied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within
its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy
the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received
by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver.
Id.
246. Subsection 2-209(5) allows a party who has made a waiver to retract
it by "reasonable notification" of the other party "unless the retraction would
be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver."
U.C.C. § 2-209(5). See also J. WHITE 8 R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 1-5, at
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templated by promissory estoppel may be less convincing evidence
of the existence of a contract than the particularized reliance con-
templated by subsections 2-201(3)(a) and (3)(c). As previously dis-
cussed,2 47 however, section 217A(2) of the Second Restatement now
explicitly directs courts to consider the evidentiary value of the
alleged reliance in promissory estoppel cases, a factor that should
afford increased protection to promisors.
Another question that bears directly on the legitimacy of con-
cerns about the harm flowing from the abrogation of the Statute
involves the true level of protection afforded promisors by the
writing requirement. If the writing required by the Statute pro-
vides promisors with scant protection against fraud, as previously
contended,248 fears of its circumvention by estoppel may be largely
unwarranted. The purpose of the writing required by section
2-201(1) is not to prove the existence of a contract, but rather to,
provide the trier of fact with evidence of the contract's existence in
addition to the oral testimony of the plaintiff.2 49 Thus, a complying
memorandum, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of either the
existence or the terms of an oral contract, and a plaintiff must still
convince the fact-finder of each.250  The fact that memoranda in
sales contracts are often far from complete statements of the terms
of the agreements they purport to represent 21 creates the possibility
that a plaintiff could successfully lie to the trier of fact about the
terms of the parties' agreement.252 Conversely, the existence of a
writing sufficient to satisfy the Statute does not necessarily indicate
that the parties ever, in fact, had an oral agreement. The writing
may have been signed for the sake of convenience in advance of an
agreement that never materialized, 21. or the writing may be a forgery,.
particularly in cases where the parties have had a continuing re-
lationship. 254 Furthermore, in some states a plaintiff may be al-
lowed, by reference to pre-Code judicial doctrine, to prove orally the
existence of a complying memorandum which was allegedly lost-
247. See notes 144-45 and accompanying text supra.
248. See notes 119-24 and accompanying text supra.
249. See J. WHITE 9 R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-4, at 61; note 52 supra..
250. J. WHITE &c R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-3, at 57.
251. Id. For a further discussion of the writing required by section 2-201
(1), see notes 49-57 and accompanying text supra.
252. J. WHITE S R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-8, at 72-73.
253. In this situation, the perjurious plaintiff may, aided by the writing,
succeed in convincing the trier of fact that agreement was in fact reached. See"
id.
254. Id. § 2-8, at 73.
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or destroyed.255 The foregoing factors have led at least one promi-
nent commentator on the Code to conclude that the writing re-
quirement is "so far from any kind of guarantee aganist successful
perjury that it is inappropriate even to call it a means to fraud
prevention at all." 256
However, even if the writing requirement is, in reality, a poor
device for fulfilling an evidentiary function, it has been observed
that the Statute, like any legal formality, can also fulfill channeling
and cautionary functions.257 The channeling function of the Statute
is to encourage knowledgeable parties to reduce their agreements
to written form and thus to provide a basis for distinguishing en-
forceable from non-enforceable contracts. 25 1  The cautionary func-
tion of the Statute stems from the idea that the act of reducing an
oral agreement to written form will impress upon the parties the
seriousness of their actions, thus deterring ill-considered promises. 259
Obviously, the reliance upon which promissory estoppel is based
cannot perform these two functions. It should be noted, however,
that all of the express exceptions to the writing requirement of
section 2-201 concern themselves solely with behavior that can serve
to perform the evidentiary function of the writing. 260 This indi-
cates either that the authors of the Code were not overly concerned
with the channeling or cautionary functions of the writing require-
ment, or that they at least felt that these functions should be super-
seded when reliable evidence of the existence of an agreement was
255. White & Summers noted:
According to one pre-Code judicial doctrine, a party need not pro-
duce a complying memo if he can prove that the writing once existed
but was somehow lost, misplaced, or destroyed. Section 2-201 does
not expressly sanction this doctrine, but pre-Code statutes did not
either. Doubtless it remains good law even under 2-201 in some states.
Id. § 2-4, at 58 (footnote omitted). See also note 122 and accompanying text
supra.
256. J. WHITE& R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 2-8, at 73 (Professors White
and Summers disagree on this point).
257. See Note, supra note 76, at 182. See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 131, at 673.
258. See Note, supra note 76, at 170-71. See also 2 A. CoRBIN, supra note
4, § 275 ("the statute renders some service by operating in terrorem to cause
important contracts to be put into writing"); Fuller, supra note 175, at 801
(a formality like the writing requirement can provide a simple, external test
for the enforceability of agreements).
259. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 175, at 800; Note, supra note 76, at 170.
260. See Edwards, supra note 60, at 218. The author observed that "the
underlying purpose of each of the methods is to provide reliable evidence of
the existence of an agreement." Id. For a discussion of the various statutory
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available. Both these functions also assume that the parties are
aware of the writing requirement, an assumption that will often be
at odds with reality.
26'
In addition to ignorance of the Statute's operation, many other
reasons exist why parties may not reduce their agreements to written
form, including reliance on an ancillary promise to reduce the agree-
ment to writing or to refrain from raising the Statute as a defense
and the mistaken belief that the writing requirement has been
satisfied.262 When agreements within the Statute's scope are reduced
to writing, the existing evidence indicates that the Statute itself
plays a small role in the parties' decision to do so.2 6 3 The Yale
Study found that few firms governed their decision to reduce agree-
ments to writing on the basis of the dollar amount involved.2 4 In-
stead, firms tended to seek the reduction of their contracts to
written form simply because it was sound business policy to have
written records.265  More importantly when considering the need
for protecting reliance on promises within the scope of the Statute,
the Yale Study discovered a strong tendency on the part of manu-
facturers who had demanded written confirmation to commence
production before receipt, especially when dealing with customers
with whom they had had prior dealings.266
The Yale Study also raised interesting questions concerning
who is most likely to be protected by the writing requirement. It
indicated that large manufacturers are more likely than small manu-
facturers to demand and receive written evidence of oral agreements
from their customers. 26 7 This situation was attributed to the dif-
ference in the nature of large and small-scale business operations 268
261. See note 29 supra.
262. See Note, supra note 33, at 597.
263. Id. at 593. The parties may, for example, decide to reduce their
agreement to writing to avoid subsequent problems of interpretation or to
prevent each other from denying the existence of the agreement. Id. at 593
n.16.
264. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
265. Yale Study, supra note 47, at 1064.
266. Id. at 1055. The Study did indicate that manufacturers were likely
to await receipt of confirmations from customers with poor credit ratings. Id.
If buyers expressed an urgent need for the goods, however, manufacturers were
likely to commence production at once without awaiting confirmation. Id.
267. Id. at 1047.
268. Id. at 1051. The Study observed:
The discovery that oral promises are more prevalent in the transac-
tions of small manufacturers than in the dealings of large ones is not
surprising .... [T]he reduction to writing of all commitments -both
of the manufacturer and of the parties with whom he deals -is an
important factor in the efficient operation of the modern large-scale
[VOL. 26: p. 63
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and to the lesser bargaining power of the small firm.26 9  It is also
reasonable to assume that the proprietors of small businesses are
less likely than their larger counterparts to have actual knowledge
of the Statute's requirements. Thus, the evidence indicates that
the Statute is most likely to operate against those who are least
likely to know of its requirements, are least able to obtain com-
pliance with those requirements if they know of them, and are
also less likely to be able to absorb the losses flowing from their
reliance if the Statute is enforced against them.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it seems reasonable to
conclude that, in reality, the writing requirement of the Statute
plays an unimportant role as either a channeling or a cautionary
device, and does not conform to the realities of prevailing business
practice, a measure which should be a touchstone for any rule of
commercial law. 270  Commercial realities in fact indicate that re-
liance upon oral promises is a common business practice 271 deserv-
ing the legal protection which could be afforded by the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. Courts that wish to retain whatever level of
"in terrorem" effect 272 the Statute exerts can do so and still avoid
the injustice to relying promisees that would follow from the
Statute's strict enforcement by limiting non-complying promisees to
the recovery of reliance damages as authorized by section 217A of
the Second Restatement.273
business organization. A small manufacturer, handling a more limited
volume of business on a more personal basis, is likely to find strict
adherence to business formalities both more foreign to the nature of
his business relationships and less necessary in the interest of efficiency.
Id. (footnote omitted).
269. Id. at 1051-55. The Study reasoned that "the relatively infrequent
demand of the small businessman for written follow-ups may also be an inci-
dent of his comparatively weak bargaining position, which may preclude him
from freely demanding written documents from his promisors even though he
would desire such documents for his own legal security." Id. at 1054-55 (foot-
note omitted).
270. Justice Stephen long ago observed in this regard that "[flaws ought to
be adjusted to the habits of society, and not to aim at remoulding them."
Stephen & Pollock, supra note 3, at 6. The Code itself implicitly recognizes
this objective by stating:
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
.U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
271. See note 267 and accompanying text supra.
272. See note 258 supra.
273. See notes 164-67 and accompanying text supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
The authors tend to cast their lot with those commentators
who have concluded that the Statute of Frauds is an anachronistic
device that no longer effectively serves its intended purposes. The
drafters of the Code made several real improvements in the Statute
designed to prevent its fraudulent use. The probability that it will
be used to perpetrate fraud, however, still outweighs any utility it
may possess as a method for fraud prevention. The extant evidence
of prevailing business practices and the cases themselves indicate
that many promisees act in reliance on oral promises within the
Statute's scope.
This reliance should be protected by the application of promis-
sory estoppel, the latest in a series of legal doctrines utilized by the
courts to mitigate the potentially harsh effects of the Statute. The
already strong trend 274 to recognize promissory estoppel as a device
for circumventing the Statute has gained increased momentum from
the promulgation of section 217A of the Second Restatement of
Contracts, which further refines and rationalizes several aspects of
the reliance doctrine's application in the Statute of Frauds context.
In addition, estoppel principles have long been applied to the
Code's predecessors and the Code expressly authorizes the supple-
mentation of its provisions with general equitable principles. No
compelling principles of law or policy exist to preclude the courts
from avoiding unjust applications of section 2-201 by the applica-
tion of promissory estoppel principles.
274. A majority of the courts that have considered the question have con-
cluded that estoppel in some form can be used to bar the operation of section
2-201 of the Code. Moreover, a few cases doing so permit estoppel to be used
as an independent basis of recovery to which the Statute is conceptually irrele-
vant. The reasons advanced by the minority that have refused so to apply
promissory estoppel, upon examination, remain unconvincing.
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